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How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical
Reading that Limits Policy Innovation
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By examining via a case study the political authority of US proliferation experts since the 1960s, this
article contributes to nuclear weapons proliferation studies and to the growing literature on the role
of expertise in democracies. First, it argues that policy choices are determined by an understanding
of history and that approaching nuclear history as a history of nuclear weapons proliferation is a
presumption shared by both US experts and policy makers. Second, it shows that this
understanding of history, relying on the metaphorical use of the term proliferation (which was
imported from biology), strongly distorts the facts. Third, the article shows that nuclear experts are
plagued by a conservative bias as a result of this use of the proliferation metaphor. Instead of
challenging the faulty proliferation narrative, most experts have backed it without question. Fourth,
the legitimacy that experts lend to this view of history has important political effects: it provides an
authoritative assessment of past policies and limits the possibility of political innovation. Policy
initiatives tend to be restricted to changes in speed or intensity. The article suggests three changes
that might restore room for informed political innovation in nuclear weapons policies.
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Experts do matter in nuclear policy. Because of the complexities of nuclear physics and
especially rocket science, experts have occupied a privileged place in the nuclear debate.
Physicists were the first experts in the nuclear realm during World War II; then came the
‘‘strategists’’ and ‘‘economists’’ from the RAND Corporation and the University of Chicago
whom Fred Kaplan tellingly labeled the ‘‘strategists in power.’’1 This study focuses on
nuclear experts in the United States because their influence has been particularly strong.
Scholars and experts have been uniquely involved in the shaping of US nuclear policy as
well as weapons design since the beginning of the nuclear age. Moreover, in the United
States, experts sometimes become policy makers.
One might object that experts have not been successful when they propose
dramatic changes in nuclear policy; for example, the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, which issued
from the scientists’ movement in 1945!46, failed, as did the atomic scientists’ proposal
advocating a world government.2
I shall argue that backing policy makers’ pre-existing worldviews should not be seen
as a lack of influence. On the contrary, in doing so, nuclear experts provide additional
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legitimacy to past policies; they also miss the opportunity to help policy makers think
creatively and suggest that they needn’t, and they delegitimize some past policies but
limit the realm of choice and the possibility of radical innovation. Changes tend to be
conceived of in terms of speed and intensity in the implementation of past policies. In
other words, experts keep policy innovation constrained by a view of history that I label
the ‘‘proliferation paradigm.’’
I borrow the notion of paradigm from the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn,
instead of using the notion of proliferation narrative, for two reasons. First, experts’ claim
of truth brings them closer to scientists. Second, Kuhn’s definition of a paradigm as ‘‘an
organizing principle which can govern perception itself’’ inside which scientific or experts’
‘‘puzzles’’ will be built is helpful in studying the effects of an intellectual framework.3
In this article, I will therefore demonstrate four things. First, US experts and policy
makers have shared the proliferation paradigm as a view of the nuclear past and future
since at least the 1960s. Second, this paradigm has been based on a careless use of the
metaphor of proliferation. Third, this metaphor introduces biases in the way people look at
the nuclear historical record, overemphasizing certain aspects and hiding others. Finally,
once I have established these biases thanks to a systematic evaluation of the historical
record, I will show the political effects of this paradigm.4
The Proliferation Paradigm as a Widespread Understanding of Nuclear History
among US Experts and Policy Makers
As William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova write: the ‘‘tendency to view nuclear
weapons diffusion in terms of automaticity and contagion is not confined to . . . a
particular political or professional orientation. Indeed, it is equally visible among U.S.
officials in past and current administrations, international organizations, scholars,
nongovernmental analysts and media pundits.’’5
The major cleavage among analysts of nuclear history shows how this idea of an
underlying law of history leading to an increase of nuclear weapon actors over time works
as a paradigm as defined above. This idea is the grand framework within which the
cleavages are taking place. Thus, the two sides of the central divide between optimists and
pessimists, as well as a recent attempt at going beyond these polarities, all share this view
of nuclear history, which suggests that the number of actors with nuclear weapons has
increased throughout the history of armament, slowly rising from zero in 1945 to the nine
known today.6 Over the last fifteen years or so, scientific research has challenged this view,
but it remains nonetheless widely held and continues to inform predictions.7
This approach now includes non-state actors, which are imagined to have the
inclination and the ability to go for the bomb. Following fears surrounding the security of
the former Soviet arsenal, the dismantling of the A.Q. Khan network revealed that
technology transfer was easier than had been anticipated.8 If most analysts agree that
nuclear terrorism is the least likely form of weapons of mass destruction terrorism, then the
debate among experts has effectively turned away from issues of nuclear capabilities and
ambitions in favor of a third matter: namely, that of preventing the acquisition and use of
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nuclear weapons.9 This reveals an implicit belief in the extension to non-state actors of the
alleged general principle of an inevitable increase in the number of actors with nuclear
weapons.
The concept of an inevitable increase in the number of actors possessing nuclear
weapons is maintained by the metaphorical clock, known as the ‘‘Doomsday Clock,’’ that
has appeared on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since June 1947. Midnight
represents nuclear apocalypse, and the clock displays the time yet to elapse (‘‘minutes to
midnight’’) before that moment arrives; according to this logic, the world is slowly but
surely nearing destruction. A rise in the number of actors with nuclear weapons is one of
the reasons for which time elapses on the clock in question.10 Following the end of the
Cold War, in 1991 the minute hand of the clock ticked backward, and humanity was said to
have moved away from the moment of its own obliteration by eleven symbolic minutes
since 1988. In the early 1990s, some members of the governing body of the Bulletin
suggested that the clock be replaced by a different symbol, but the proposal was rejected.
This illustrates the permanence of a desire to imagine a history oriented toward
proliferation, even among those who are committed to abolishing nuclear weapons, as
has historically been the case of the Bulletin.11
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a series of National Intelligence Estimates and
scholarly works were already focusing on the ‘‘N"1 country’’ problem and trying to
identify the relevant candidates. The 1965 Gilpatrick Committee report was another
version of this approach, offering one of the earliest mentions of a proliferation ‘‘chain
reaction.’’12 This is only the pessimistic version of the proliferation paradigm.
International relations scholar and neorealist Kenneth Waltz and the so-called
optimists offer another version based on the assertion that a steady rise in the number of
nuclear weapon states increases international security by establishing new situations with
mutual deterrents. Waltz considers this trend to be as necessary as its pessimistic
counterpart, even though he suggests that the pace will be slow and points out that a
general theory of international relations cannot predict a phenomenon as complex as
proliferation.13
The most radical variant of this analysis of nuclear history, which sees it as being
inevitably linear, views the historical trend in terms of speed: only the rate of the increase
in the number of nuclear weapon states can be altered, and not the direction of the trend
(see Figure 1). This idea is an old one. Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman provide a recent
example of that linear understanding of nuclear history in their book The Nuclear Express
(which received media attention as well as criticism).14 ‘‘In 1938, the Nuclear Express pulled
out of Berlin. For half a century it picked up speed, but never came off the rails,’’ wrote
Reed and Stillman.15 ‘‘The Nuclear Express now hurtles into a new century with a boxcar of
new technology, a hopper filled with fissile materials, a mail car packed with cash and
millions of sleeping passengers. The engineers driving this train seem unconcerned about
the safety and well-being of those passengers, even their own children. A massive train
wreck, defying all previous human experience, could lie ahead.’’16
A more moderate*and widespread*variant maintains that the trend is necessary.
This variant is less emphatic where its linear development is concerned: it recognizes that
there are periods of stagnation and even times when arsenals and the number of nuclear
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weapon states decrease but sees these as moments of deviation in a wider trend.
Advocates of this variant have recourse to a ‘‘wave’’ metaphor in which the size and
number of waves that provoke an increase in the number of nuclear weapon states are
greater than the size and number of those that do not. This vision therefore points toward
a new wave of nuclear proliferation.17 Triggered by North Korea and Iran, the likes of
Japan, Egypt, and Turkey (undoubtedly followed by Indonesia, Australia, Brazil, and Saudi
Arabia) are seen as potential near-term nuclear states, which would make a nuclear
‘‘swell’’*to extend the wave metaphor further*quite likely.
Whether pessimistic or optimistic, linear or nonlinear, the proliferation paradigm also
implies retrospective illusion and labeling. Indeed, while the debate about nuclear
weapons was not framed in terms of proliferation until the late 1950s or early 1960s,
proliferation experts anachronistically label the Soviet decision to go nuclear as ‘‘the first
case of proliferation’’ because of their understanding of what would come next.18 This
retrospective illusion also has an impact on the ex post understanding of past surprises. It
FIGURE 1
Linear representation of the ‘‘proliferation paradigm.’’
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leads to remembering the unexpected cases of nuclear acquisition while neglecting the
numerous surprises of states deciding not to go nuclear; the states that gave up their
nuclear ambitions or weapons would be forgotten for the same reasons.19 The persistent
excessive pessimism of forecasters in terms of the pace of proliferation as well as
the number of actors predicted to cross the nuclear threshold in the years after the
assessment suggests that the favorable surprises were far more numerous.20 Even
the exceptional South African case of dismantlement of an existing arsenal took the
intelligence services and the experts by surprise. President F.W. de Klerk announced on
March 24, 1993 that the South African arsenal had been dismantled, but the intelligence
community remained suspicious long after the end of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) inspections.21 Similarly, when nuclear weapons were not found in Iraq in
2003, the first reaction of the experts was not to contemplate absence but rather to build
scenarios in which the weapons could have been transferred to Syria or destroyed just
before the US invasion. Even when these scenarios were considered improbable, the
possibility of the weapons being buried somewhere or stolen was often mentioned.22
These cases show that when an anomaly occurs vis-a`-vis the proliferation paradigm,
experts tend to deny the anomaly. The reactions in both the Iraqi and South African cases
show how hard it is to go against the proliferation paradigm because the absence of
evidence can never incontrovertibly become evidence of absence. It therefore seems
obvious why Harald Mu¨ller and Andreas Schmidt consider ‘‘the story of deproliferation’’ as
‘‘little known.’’23
The consensus surrounding the proliferation paradigm cannot be fully explained by
the argument that the individuals who adhere to it are ‘‘problem-solving’’ experts, and
that members of a more marginal group will do the critical-thinking work.24 In fact, as seen
in the case of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, most of those who were advocating
disarmament or abolition accepted the proliferation paradigm and used it to complain
about the lack of progress.
The Metaphor of Proliferation as a Cognitive Framework for the Proliferation
Paradigm
The numerous different versions of that predominant analysis now have to be related to
the expert community’s systematic use of the metaphor of ‘‘proliferation’’ in order to
understand how it can lead to the general consensus analyzed in the previous section.
Indeed, this use has prevailed at least since policy analyst and strategist Albert Wohlstetter
applied the term to nuclear weapons in April 1961 as the cognitive framework through
which this interpretation of nuclear history has been imparted.25 This is all the more
important because the strongest biases attached to the proliferation paradigm can be
traced to the careless use of this metaphor.
The shift from the term ‘‘dissemination’’ to ‘‘proliferation’’ establishes the metaphor
that will shape the most prevalent interpretation of the phenomenon. The ‘‘problem of the
N"1 country,’’ as Wohlstetter termed it, began to be addressed in university circles
between 1958 and 1962 at the exact time when the term ‘‘proliferation’’ was transposed
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by Wohlstetter into its new domain.26 What might have remained a mere simile was
concentrated into a metaphor: the increase in the number of actors with nuclear weapons
is not like proliferation; it is proliferation.
Metaphors bring certain attributes to the fore while adding or deleting others; they
limit the cognitive framework through which one conceives the phenomenon in question.
By describing a battle using terms taken from the vocabulary of chess, for instance, one
removes the emotional facet of war.27 While the legitimacy of using metaphors in scientific
discourse has been acknowledged, this requires either that nothing be deduced from the
components of the metaphor or that scientists continue to maintain a reflexive
relationship with it.28
To understand how the metaphor of proliferation lays the foundations for a belief in
an inevitable increase in the number of nuclear weapon states, therefore, it is important to
examine what exactly can be deduced from it.
First, it is worth addressing the strictly pathological connotations of the term
‘‘proliferation’’ as employed in the lexical field of biology, where it has been associated
with cancer since the early twentieth century.29 The process of cellular reproduction is
monitored from outside, and when this monitoring fails, degeneration occurs and cancer
develops, sometimes to the point of killing the organism in question. The pessimistic
version of the paradigm can therefore find a starting point in this aspect of the metaphor;
if you want to monitor proliferation, the biological metaphor suggests that an external
interuention is necessary. The pathological connotation related to the circulation of
weapons then spread to those states that sought to acquire nuclear weapons following
the Cold War.30
Second, it must be noted that the expression ‘‘proliferation of nuclear weapons’’
underlines the element of self-begetting that is present in the phenomenon in question.
This meaning appears in English even before the pathological element is introduced;
indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition, which first appeared
in the 1860s: ‘‘the formation or development of cells by budding or division.’’31 When
transposed into the nuclear domain, the term retains the connotation of an automatic
process and leaves no room for the political factor, which had no relevance in cellular
reproduction. Do the weapons themselves breed more weapons? It seems unlikely, but
the metaphor disregards this fact. The biological metaphor of proliferation applied to the
nuclear domain therefore results in a purely quantitative approach to the phenomenon
and ultimately leads to a type of technological and economic determinism. This reasoning
is a major source of the proliferation paradigm and lies behind the fears associated with
the notion of ‘‘nuclear latency’’ that reemerges in the literature.32 If one accords the
metaphor its full value, then civilian nuclear programs serve as a halfway house in the
multiplication of military nuclear arsenals. Such technological and economic teleology can
be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it could be suggested that this attitude is
born of prudence. In this case, since nuclear proliferation was identified on January 31,
1992 by the UN Security Council as a threat to international peace and security, the most
reliable policy for achieving nonproliferation is to prevent actors from acquiring the means
to build a bomb by erecting technical barriers to that process.33 This option removes the
need to identify the proliferators and to uncover their motives. On the other hand, one
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could suggest that the effectiveness of the metaphor of proliferation in the political
domain is even greater if it implies that the bomb is seen as intrinsically desirable.
However extreme it may seem, the latter interpretation of the metaphor*which is
tantamount to asserting that states do not proliferate merely because they are able to do
so*is not uncommon.34 This analysis is compatible with the two main versions of the
realist approach, one of which sees the bomb as being thoroughly desirable, while the
other recognizes that it has drawbacks as well as advantages. Indeed, as international
relations scholar Jacques Hymans has put it, ‘‘soft’’ realism can readily become ‘‘hard’’
realism to the extent that the security guarantee will always be treated with some degree
of suspicion.35 The economic approach of Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator also
demonstrates the desirability of the bomb when the authors state that ‘‘as the cost of
nuclear weapons falls, . . . there will be new nuclear states unless new policies increase this
cost.’’36 A variation on this same theme is found in the widespread belief that chemical
and biological weapons are the poor man’s atom bomb.37
Third, the metaphor also implies a chain reaction. This element seems to be
underlined later in the 1960s in the writings of physicist Sir John Cockcroft.38 Just as
cellular proliferation is a phenomenon that continues to occur following an initial
division, nuclear proliferation is imagined in terms of a chain reaction once one party
crosses the nuclear threshold. This also marks the beginning of a linear approach in terms
of speed, which presents a series of waves as periods of temporary acceleration in the
phenomenon of proliferation. When a state proliferates, the most widespread analyses
argue that other states in the region will do the same in order to maintain a certain
strategic balance. Today, most experts subscribe to the image of the ‘‘strategic chain
reaction.’’39 Even political science scholar Etel Solingen, who criticizes the approach,
occasionally succumbs to the fear of a chain reaction of proliferation in Southeast Asia.40
Though it has been established that the proliferation paradigm relies on the careless
use of the metaphor of proliferation, this view of history remains to be tested. It is
important to note, however, that the argument presented above does not imply that a
historical discourse devoid of all metaphor is actually possible. Rather, I need only posit
that a reflexive approach to the metaphor in question remains a possibility.
The Proliferation Paradigm in Light of Nuclear History
Before examining the implications of the proliferation paradigm, it is useful to address the
deductions arising from the metaphor that leads to that approach. Let me briefly list them:
the pathological connotation related to the phenomenon of proliferation and transposed
to those entities that represent it; the self-begetting nature of the phenomenon, which
ultimately leads to capacity determinism; and, finally, the logic of a chain reaction, which
suggests that the bomb represents the most appropriate response to a security threat
posed by proliferation on the part of a neighbor.
First, proliferating regimes can alter their strategic approach before and after they
have crossed the nuclear threshold. This argument throws into relief the limitations of the
pathological aspect that the metaphor attributes to the bomb, whereby the proliferators
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are the hotbed that allows the disease to spread. The illness, then, can regress.
Furthermore, most proliferating states have not succeeded in crossing the nuclear
threshold, and South Africa dismantled its entire nuclear arsenal after having built six
nuclear bombs and having had a fully operational nuclear weapon at its disposal for ten
years.41 Similarly, three states*Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan*came into existence
with considerable portions of the Soviet arsenal within their borders, and all returned
those arsenals to Russia under the Lisbon Protocol, which was signed on May 23, 1992; the
arsenals were dismantled by 1996.42 Even Libya, which supported terrorist groups until the
late 1980s and tried to acquire weapons after Muammar Qaddafi came to power in 1969,
completely reconsidered its strategy from 1992 onward, when it included its weapons of
mass destruction programs in negotiations with Washington and London. After lengthy
talks, Libya officially announced that it was renouncing nuclear weapons in December
2003 and that it would dismantle its existing facilities under IAEA control and within a very
tight deadline.43
Second, the self-begetting nature of proliferation (which is tantamount to the
general principle of capacity determinism) maintains that any state able to acquire nuclear
weapons will do so. There are at least two versions of this idea. One posits that there is a
constant desire to go for the bomb, but that this desire can be tempered by technological
barriers. The other agrees that this desire exists, but maintains that the networking of
proliferation channels as confirmed by the discovery of the illicit A.Q. Khan nuclear ring
considerably reduces the number of technological barriers in existence, so that countries
that want to acquire the bomb will always find the financial and human means to take
whatever steps will lead them to nuclear technology. In other words, where there is a will,
there is a way. The desire for the bomb is present in both of these variants; they diverge
only in their stances on the possibility of taking action and limiting it. Yet this pseudo-
principle is increasingly undermined by the historical record.
FIGURE 2
Historical comparison of the number of states with the technological capacity to acquire the
bomb with the number of states that have done so.
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If internal political debate sometimes sees the argument of capacity as a means of
persuasion for crossing the nuclear threshold, as was the case in India, this does not always
have to be the case.44 Technologically advanced states such as Switzerland and Sweden
have engaged in military nuclear activities yet have never crossed the threshold. Japan
and Germany also fit into this category, and are even more relevant to this discussion
because eminent nuclear experts have predicted that they would go nuclear.45
Furthermore, if the general principle in question were valid, no nuclear weapon state
would have relinquished the bomb, including South Africa. As time goes by, nuclear
technology spreads, but contrary to what technological determinism would expect,
nuclear weapons projects have increasingly been failing to achieve their ultimate
objective, and those that have succeeded in recent years have needed more time than
those undertaken in previous decades (see Figure 2).46 One final argument to submit here
is that, of all the states that have engaged in nuclear activity, those that put an end to their
nuclear activities after acquiring a research reactor are more numerous than those that did
so before acquiring such a facility. In other words, such a considerable technological
advance does not make it more likely that a state will cross the nuclear threshold.47
Third, the bomb has not necessarily been seen as the most effective security
guarantee against a proliferator, which casts the image of the chain reaction in a
considerably different light. Egypt serves as a telling example here. In the 1950s, Cairo
launched a military nuclear program in order to fend off any potential trouble from Tel
Aviv and to establish Egypt as a regional leader.48 The existence of an Israeli program was
not well known at the time, and Egypt’s conventional capacity was significantly higher
than that of Israel.49 When, at the beginning of the 1970s, Egypt abandoned its nuclear
ambitions, the Israeli program was better known than when Egypt’s program had begun,
and the balance of conventional capacity had tipped against Egypt: Iran, Iraq, and Libya*
all racing against one another for regional leadership*were suspected of proliferation.50
Finally, Cairo had no security guarantees from Moscow. Some Egyptians believed that the
Soviet Union would commit to protecting their country if Israel acquired a deterrent, but
other sources flatly deny that such an agreement was in place. In addition, President
Gamal Abdel Nasser publicly rejected its existence.51 If the general principle discussed
above held true, the significant degeneration of Egyptian security between the mid-1950s
and the 1970s, including its defeat in 1967, should have led Egypt to take steps toward
proliferation, had a response to proliferation been necessary at the time. But it did not.
Scientifically, however, Egypt was the best equipped of all Arab nations: the desert would
have proved an excellent site for testing, and in the 1960s, Egypt’s resources were equal or
superior to those of Israel or Pakistan when those states began their nuclear programs.52
The nuclear chain reaction, a recurring tool of the alarmist camp inside the proliferation
paradigm since the 1960s, is therefore not supported by much empirical evidence.
The three deductions that can be drawn from the metaphor of proliferation are
therefore excessive when one consults nuclear history. Having established above that this
metaphor was a cornerstone of the proliferation paradigm, I can now turn to the biases
that it introduced in the general understanding of nuclear history.
In general terms, the proliferation paradigm has inspired excessively pessimistic
predictions that have not come true. Moreover, the minute hand of the ‘‘Doomsday Clock’’
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has had to be turned back on several occasions*in 1960, 1963, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1990,
1991, and 2010.53 If one examines horizontal proliferation, the proliferation paradigm
obscures two crucial phenomena in nuclear history.
First, the vast majority of states simply have not tried to acquire nuclear weapons.
The most pessimistic studies show that only thirty-nine states have engaged in nuclear
activities at one time or another, regardless of any decisions to pursue the bomb.54 This
statistic does little to corroborate any belief in the intrinsic appeal of the bomb. Of the 192
states currently recognized by the United Nations, the most pessimistic figure for the
number of states that at one time or another have engaged in nuclear activity stands at
20.3 percent. Naturally, the number of states having crossed the threshold is even lower:
4.7 percent, including North Korea (see Table 1).
Second, the general principle of a linear rise in the number of nuclear weapon states
is undermined by the period from 1991 until 1998. During this time, not one state crossed
the nuclear threshold, and no new proliferating state came on the scene.55 This was not
merely a period of status quo or nonproliferation, but rather the golden age of
deproliferation, if viewed objectively rather than focusing exclusively on states that
were acknowledged as having nuclear weapons. From this perspective, South Africa
dismantled its nuclear arsenal fully between 1990 and 1991. The new government of
Nelson Mandela, which was elected in 1994, chose not to reverse that decision.56 Similarly,
it is worth repeating that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all returned their inherited
arsenals to Russia. The fact remains that between 1991 and 1996, when the dismantlement
of the arsenals was complete, those three states were, objectively speaking, nuclear; at the
time, Ukraine and Kazakhstan had (in purely quantitative terms) the third- and fourth-
largest arsenals in the world.57 In this sense, ten states were effectively said to have nuclear
weapons in 1991*the five official states plus Israel, South Africa, and the three former
Soviet republics*whereas five years later, that figure had fallen to six. If India is included
by virtue of its peaceful test in 1974, the figures are eleven and seven, respectively.
Horizontal deproliferation does exist, then, in spite of the efforts of the proliferation
metaphor to obscure it, although we must avoid extrapolating it into an irreversible trend,
lest we find ourselves embracing a belief that directly counters that which I am examining
here.
TABLE 1
Retrospective classification of states’ military nuclear status in 2010.
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Both of these factors lead to the acknowledgement that proliferation and
abandonment of nuclear activity are twin exceptions in nuclear history. What is more,
successful proliferation is less common than abandonment. Indeed, of all the states that
have, at one time or another, harbored ambitions to acquire a nuclear weapon, the
majority have abandoned them (twenty-eight states)*and very few (only ten) have
succeeded in crossing the threshold.
Thus, these inadequacies of the proliferation paradigm required nuclear experts to
critically discuss their biases. Quite ironically, US strategist Bernard Brodie foresaw the two
main characteristics of the reification process, no later than 1965, in the following terms:
‘‘It is characteristic of our convictions, in strategy as in all affairs in life, that we tend to
regard them as natural and inevitable. However, if we examine the history of the ideas
contained in those convictions, we usually find that they have evolved in a definitely
traceable way.’’58 Beyond the lack of precision in the critical analysis of statesmen’s
categories and the overall neglect of Brodie’s prophetic statement, another failing of the
community of US experts stems from the fact that the reification of the proliferation
metaphor that took place had strong policy implications that have not always been
recognized as such.
Political Effects of the Proliferation Paradigm
The proliferation paradigm influences the type of possible political action, its preferred
modalities, and its timing. These consequences result from the reassessment of past
practices and policies provided by the proliferation paradigm.
The paradigm discredits disarmament moves as contrary to the ‘‘direction of
history,’’ claiming that actions in favor of disarmament would just be utopian and
therefore impossible. This linear interpretation of history leads to a focus on arms control
instead of disarmament, because it only pretends to slow the pace of the movement of
history and not to try to reverse it.59 Indeed, the notion of arms control was introduced in
the late 1950s and then strengthened by the generalization of the above-described
metaphor of proliferation.60 One should note that disarmament is considered utopian for
today and tomorrow because in this version of nuclear history, it was such in the past. We
have previously seen the persisting suspicion with which past cases of disarmament have
been considered. Proliferation being the direction of history, all the past nonproliferation
policies will be considered as necessary but not sufficient, and should therefore be
preserved in spite of their mixed record.
To assess the political implications of the proliferation paradigm in more detail and
see how the paradigm leads to a form of conservatism that limits policy change, I will start
from the three deductions that can be drawn from the metaphor of proliferation: the self-
begetting nature of the phenomenon, the logic of a chain reaction, and the pathological
connotation related to the phenomenon and transposed to those entities that represent it.
First, the idea of a self-begetting process leads to policies that aim to fight
proliferation by ignoring demand and trying to diminish supply. Expert support for such
policies will then be coupled with a critique of past policies of openness and sharing of
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nuclear technology as careless actions that speed up the pace of proliferation and a
reinterpretation of the NPT as focusing primarily on the goal of nonproliferation.61 Perhaps
the ultimate formulation of this approach was made by an analyst from the Nuclear
Suppliers Group who stated that ‘‘the technical inability to make weapons seems a more
reliable guarantee of nonproliferation than any solemn international commitment.’’62 The
most striking effect of this approach has been that, over the last twenty years, the mere
possession of a ‘‘significant quantity’’ of fissile material has become the criterion
bestowing nuclear statehood instead of the actual detonation of a device.63 Once again,
the proliferation paradigm will give the retrospective impression that past policies have
been at least partially successful and should therefore be maintained. The failure of
policies of denial to prevent poor states like Pakistan and North Korea to get nuclear
weapons, as well as the success of China’s nuclear program between 1955 and 1964
despite its scarcity of resources, will not be enough to initiate a change in approach,
suggesting that it is only the moment of action that can be modified.
Second, the nuclear chain reaction is considered security driven. Therefore, the
proliferation paradigm will lead to an emphasis on the past successes of nuclear extended
deterrence as a nonproliferation tool, thereby promoting its extension. The proliferation
paradigm suggests that this nuclear security guarantee has been a decisive element for
states that have not gone nuclear in the past and supposes it will remain so in the future.
The cases of France and the United Kingdom, which went nuclear in spite of a nuclear
security guarantee, and those of Libya, South Africa, and all the non-nuclear weapon states
that do not benefit from such a guarantee, will not cause a change in policy. The
conservative implications of the chain reaction argument go beyond that. Indeed, such a
view implies that nuclear weapons have been the ultimate security guarantor since their
invention and will remain so for the foreseeable future; it implies that the nuclear
protector will have to keep more nuclear weapons than it considers necessary for its own
security*both in the name of the security of those it protects and in the name of
nonproliferation. The only possible change here is limited to the identity of the provider of
a nuclear security guarantee.
Third, the pathological connotation fuels the pessimists’ and alarmists’ arguments
and urges action to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The proliferation paradigm is
supposed to work both for the past and the future, and its incorporation into public
speech is supposed to play out as a self-denying prophecy.64 Acceptance that the
proliferation paradigm favors suspicious assumptions and only takes into account
surprises with negative outcomes in its understanding of the past is likely to push
further the logic of preventive action against the spread of nuclear weapons. This
paradigm promotes a suspicious interpretation of uncertainty that leads to scrutiny of
states as potential proliferators. Transposing the paradigm to the question of how to
anticipate future surprises leads to the consideration that most surprises will be
proliferation surprises, some of which are not even conceivable now. Such a position is
perfectly reflected by the idea of ‘‘unknown unknowns’’ promoted by Donald Rumsfeld
(then the US secretary of defense) in a February 12, 2002 press conference*an idea that
included only potentially catastrophic surprises. The pathological connotation rejects the
possibility of a change in preferences regarding nuclear weapons and often leads to the
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idea that only a shock can stop nuclear ambitions. The shock could be preventive strikes
or preventive war. The bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor by the Israeli Air Force is
therefore presented as a success that prevented Iraq from obtaining nuclear weapons
before Operation Desert Storm. The paradoxical element here is that, as in the previous
cases, even the use of violence appears legitimate because the proliferation paradigm
regards it as legitimate in the past. Even measures of shock should then be regarded as
conservative measures.65
Conclusion: Repoliticizing Policy Makers’ View of Nuclear History and
Changing Their Expectations of Expert Advice
The proliferation paradigm prevents political innovation and is based on a view of history
that strongly overestimates the historical role and appeal of nuclear weapons, leading to
ill-conceived policies.66 It is a fundamentally non-political approach that does not take into
account the possibility of change over time in the role and appeal of nuclear weapons.
What needs to be done? In light of the preceding analysis, at least three changes
would seem helpful: a reassessment of nuclear history countering the biases of the
proliferation paradigm, a reaffirmation of the political dimension of decisions in the realm
of nuclear weapons, and a change in what is expected from knowledge providers, be they
experts or intelligence agencies.
The first change consists of realizing that nuclear weapons are not, and have never
been, intrinsically desirable*and it is wrong to reduce that fact to a lack of capability or
security threat. Changing the metaphor and returning to the term ‘‘dissemination’’ instead
of ‘‘proliferation’’ might remind policy makers to be more careful in the way they connect
facts. However, this change in terminology is not a magical solution. Indeed, the metaphor
was the core of this view of history, but not its only source. Getting rid of the metaphor
may help but will not solve the problem. Even Kenneth Waltz, the leading proponent of
the optimistic version of the proliferation paradigm, believes that the term proliferation is
less than apt.67
Second, political responsibility should be reaffirmed. This implies a recognition that
political decisions have to be made in a situation of irreducible uncertainty about the
intent and the capability of the other; they are bets based on a hierarchy of values and
priorities. When questions about whether nations will acquire nuclear weapons are
considered, there cannot be an objective answer, even if advisers present their solutions as
absolute truths. Policy makers should not try to escape the tragedy of this situation; they
should instead start to think that decision makers on the other side are facing the same
kinds of dilemmas. The fact that US presidents have subordinated nonproliferation
concerns to other policy priorities in the cases of Israel or Pakistan, for example, in the
same way that other nuclear powers have, should be considered carefully. Such
consideration calls for a political understanding of nuclear history, rather than the
supposed irresistible appeal of nuclear weapons, on the side of suspected states.68 These
words might sound very general, but taken seriously, they lead to a realization that worst-
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case assumptions and ‘‘speeding conservatism’’ are neither the only nor the true answers
to a political problem, even if they are often presented as such.
The third move that would prove helpful is to reshape what is expected from the
experts. Willingly or unwillingly, their judgments are political because they are driven by
an understanding of history that is, most often, the proliferation paradigm. So, instead of
expecting from them the truth about what is to be done, policy makers would benefit
much more from asking for three specific things: as much factual accuracy as possible,
recognition of the limits of what can be known, and a much more challenging attitude vis-
a`-vis what sounds like consensual truth.69 Overestimations of what can be known as well
as a tendency toward confirmation bias have already been diagnosed as responsible for
two major intelligence failures: the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003
and the lack of anticipation of the attack on Israel in 1973.70 This last point is not to deny
that knowledge informs policy. The point of this article is to say that certainty prevents
imagination and creativity in politics and surely prevents any kind of shift from hope to
audacity. It is far less sure that this need for certainty coupled with fear and mistrust
provides the best guide for prudence.
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